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Abstract 
 
The increasing autonomy of Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANETs) has enabled a great many 
large-scale unguided missions, such as agricultural 
planning, conservation and similar surveying tasks. 
Commercial and military institutions have expressed 
great interest in such ventures, raising the question 
of security as the application of such systems in 
potentially hostile environments. Preventing theft, 
disruption or destruction of such MANETs through 
cyber-attacks has become a focus for many 
researchers as a result. Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs) have been shown to enhance the security of 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs). VPNs do not 
normally support broadcast communication, 
reducing their effectiveness in high-traffic MANETs 
which have many broadcast communication 
requirements. To support routing, broadcast updates 
and efficient MANET communication a Virtual 
Closed Network (VCN) architecture is proposed. By 
supporting private, secure communication in unicast, 
multicast and broadcast modes, VCNs provide an 
efficient alternative to VPNs when securing 
MANETs. Comparative analysis of the set-up and 
security overheads of VCN and VPN approaches is 
provided between OpenVPN, IPsec, Virtual Private 
LAN Service (VPLS), and the proposed VCN 
solution: Security Using Pre-Existing Routing for 
MANETs (SUPERMAN).  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Interest in swarms of autonomous UAVs is 
growing rapidly, with civilian and military 
authorities spearheading initiatives that will see the 
deployment of many aerial mobile nodes capable of 
self-control and self-guidance on a wide range of 
missions [1]. A key issue of such projects is the 
security of the communication required for inter-
swarm communication. Autonomous systems require 
a large amount of communication to operate, before 
even considering any swarm-to-base communication 
requirements [2]. As a result, secure Mobile Ad hoc 
Network (MANET) communication has become a 
key topic for discussion, where autonomous activity 
is seen as desirable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) provide a means 
for nodes to communicate securely and privately 
over an otherwise insecure medium. Traditionally, 
such networks have operated over the Internet with 
the assumption that due to the variable routes and 
dynamic topology, the lines of communication 
cannot be trusted. More recently, this philosophy has 
been applied to Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
(MANETs).  
MANETs typically use wireless radio 
communication as their transmission medium. Due to 
the inherently broadcast nature of typical radio 
transceivers, the medium can be assumed to be 
insecure. This is known as the open-medium 
problem; the medium itself is observable by third-
parties in range and is therefore insecure unless steps 
are taken to prevent trivial observation of 
communication. 
VPN approaches have been used to secure 
MANETs, VPLS most notably for its mesh-based 
approach to the formation of a secure network over 
insecure infrastructure. IPsec [3] and OpenVPN [4] 
have also seen use in MANETs comprised of 
roaming nodes, allowing communication over third 
party wireless infrastructure between nodes when 
they move out of range of each other. In all such 
cases, the emphasis has been on point-to-point 
communication; in which nodes are expected to 
communicate on a 1:1 basis.  
Virtual Closed Networks (VCN) deviate from the 
VPN philosophy in two key areas; behavioural 
control of communication and hierarchical provision 
of security. VCN nodes must submit to a common 
set of communication behaviours. Deviation from 
these behaviours mark a node as an imposter, or 
malicious node. All communication outside of the 
expected set is ignored, and the malicious node is 
denied access to the network.  
This paper investigates the efficiency of the VCN 
approach, when compared with a selection of VPN 
protocols. The security features of the VCN and 
VPN approach are compared in qualitative 
discussion, while the costs associated with securing a 
MANET using OpenVPN, IPsec, VPLS [5] and 
Security Using Pre-Existing Routing for Mobile Ad 
hoc Networks (SUPERMAN) are analysed using the 
quantitative results of simulation.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Autonomous MANET Security 
Considerations 
 
The primary concern for any MANET using 
wireless communication, is the open-medium 
problem [6]. The problem is characterised by an 
insecure communication medium; a means of 
communication that can be trivially observed and 
interfered with, with no ability to directly protect the 
medium against such attacks. The open-medium 
problem means that any communication between 
nodes in a MANET must be assumed to be insecure 
by its very nature, requiring that steps be taken to 
ensure confidentiality, integrity and authentication.  
 
2.1.1. Vulnerabilities. The first key weakness 
exposed by the open-medium problem is that of 
observable communication. Passive attacks against 
networks are a common precursor to more aggressive 
cyber-attacks. Eavesdropping on communication, 
recording data and mapping the topology of a 
network from the outside are all possible if a 
malicious observer has unfettered access to 
information flowing through the network. Such 
information must be protected to ensure that 
malicious observers are not able to steal identifying 
information or critical information about the nature 
of the mission being undertaken by the network.  
A second stage of attack is likely, should 
sufficient information be gathered [7]. 
Impersonation, Sybil, wormhole and black hole 
attacks depend on a certain critical mass of data 
being accumulated to allow malicious nodes the 
ability to fool legitimate nodes into believing that the 
malicious nodes are members of the network [8].  
Such attacks are referred to as active attacks, and 
they directly impact on network attributes, such as 
quality of service and reliability. They frequently 
compromise related functions of the network, such as 
the application layer requirements of 
communication; the ability to communicate mission-
vital information or control associated functions in a 
distributed fashion. By compromising 
communication in a MANET, an attacker can disrupt 
or destroy the associated functionality of the 
network.  
 
2.1.2. Securing the network. ITU-Rec X.805 
outlines the security threats to wireless networks and 
associated defences against such threats. Five threats 
are identified, and eight solutions are proposed to 
counter them. The five threats are; destruction, 
corruption or modification of data, theft or removal 
of data, disclosure of information, and interruption of 
services [9].  
The proposed counters to these threats are; access 
control, authentication, non-repudiation, data 
confidentiality, communication security, data 
integrity, availability, and privacy. It is possible that 
only some of these security services are required. For 
example; non-repudiation is only required if 
interruption of services is anticipated. However, it 
must be noted that in long-lived MANETs, operating 
without human control, full-suite security is 
preferable due to the inability to predict the nature, 
form or intent of a cyber-attack that occurs in the 
field.  
Table 1 highlights the identified security threats 
and their solutions.   
 
Table 1. ITU-Rec X.805 mapping of threats to security solutions 
 
 Loss Mod. Theft 
 
Disclose Denial 
of 
service 
Access 
control 
     
Auth.      
Non-
repudiation 
     
Data 
confidence 
     
Comm. 
security 
     
Data 
integrity 
     
Available      
Privacy      
 
2.1.3. The implications of service interruption, 
disclosure or corruption. In an autonomous 
MANET a means of allowing nodes to collaborate 
and avoid workload duplication is required. 
Consensus Based Bundle Algorithm (CBBA) [10] 
and it is clustered contemporary, CF-CBBA, are 
algorithms that provide such services [2].  
Although these algorithms can provide the means 
for a MANET to perform complex task 
collaboratively and efficiently among their 
constituent nodes, they are not secure. They are 
collaborative applications, requiring a great deal of 
communication between networked nodes even in 
the most efficient of configurations. As a result, they 
are vulnerable to the interception of mission critical 
data. 
Over a wireless medium, this is a readily apparent 
problem. Passive attackers may derive information 
about the whereabouts (or destination) of nodes, 
allowing the planning of theft or physical 
compromise of nodes. Destruction of data may slow 
or prevent the task allocation process reaching 
convergence, consuming resources wastefully. More 
subtly, corruption of that data may allow an attacker 
to decide where nodes go, facilitating theft, physical 
compromise or allowing the pursuit of other 
surreptitious goals that require that the autonomous 
MANET be manipulated, but not prevented from 
functioning.  
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With these issues presenting a very real threat to 
the efficiency, sanctity and ability of the network to 
perform its task, it is apparent that security must be 
applied to ensure that task allocation is protected 
from attack.  
 
2.2. Virtual Private Networks 
 
VPNs represent a class of network that operates in 
a pessimistic state. Unlike naive MANET 
implementations, where the medium is assumed to 
be trustworthy and all node benevolent, VPNs 
assume that the medium is insecure, and that the 
network is subject to observation and attack at any 
moment.  
Privacy is the core philosophy of the VPN. VPNs 
were initially intended to protect the privacy of 
communication between end-points over unsecured 
mediums, such as the Internet. Some point-to-point 
implementations have been proposed, though these 
are usually limited in scope (closely situated 
collections of trusted nodes) and are more akin to 
VCN architectures than traditional VPN architectures 
[11].  
OpenVPN is an open-source application 
developed to secure communications between 
machines in separate locations, over a potentially 
insecure link [12]. It is capable of traversing multiple 
network domains and makes use of the OpenSSL and 
TLS standards for certificate exchange, or pre-shared 
key-based approaches to authenticating legitimate 
members of the VPN. This is further enhanced by the 
addition of user-selected passphrase insertion to the 
SSL/TLS authentication process, should the user 
select this option.  
VPLS adds multicast (and in some cases 
broadcast) functionality, emulating Ethernet 
functionality to extend the ability to address all 
members of the VPN despite their disparate 
geographical locations and variable routes (which 
VPLS does not track or maintain). Due to the added 
complexity of maintaining a LAN emulation over 
potentially insecure infrastructure, a full mesh is 
required [13]. This means that all nodes must be 
connected to all other nodes. That may be over n-
hops, but all nodes must have a viable end-to-end 
connection to all others to participate in the network. 
Although useful for MANET implementations, 
where broadcast functionality is highly desirable, the 
additional memory overhead and connectivity 
requirements can be a problem in networks with an 
unreliable communication medium. VPLS has been 
secured using modified Host Identity Protocol (HIP) 
Base Exchange (BEX) [14].  
IPsec is a suite of protocols intended to provide 
secure end-to-end communication between nodes in 
a network. IPsec is typical of VPN philosophy, in 
that it provides end-to-end security between nodes, 
but plays no role in point-to-point security and relies 
on secure routing to protect data in transit. It extends 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication services 
to mutually authenticated end-points, but does not 
provide MANET-specific support. MANET 
implementation, such as MANIPSEC have been 
shown to improve the performance of IPsec and 
extend multicast capabilities to communication using 
IPsec over MANETs, but the intensive key-exchange 
and authentication mechanisms continue to represent 
a substantial overhead for resource-limited networks 
[15].  
 
3. Virtual Closed Networks 
 
VCNs differ from VPNs, in that the focus is on 
the network, not the links that form it. VPNs seek to 
protect instances of communication between nodes 
in a network, they define a series of secure links 
between nodes, with may be 1:1 or 1:N in nature 
[16]. However, the focus is set on the links, the 
network topology, access control policy and 
communication medium play no role in defining the 
VPN. VCNs adhere to a holistic core philosophy. 
They are intended to provide security by closing the 
network against outside interference, both end-to-end 
and point-to-point.  
A VCN will extend protection beyond 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication, by 
providing services that ensure routes are secure. This 
provides weak guarantees of delivery; weak due to 
the fact that medium-control is not a part of most 
VCNs, and so disruption of the communication 
medium may still cause loss of data. However, such 
loss will not be driven by the inclusion of malicious 
nodes in the routing process; a VCN will not tolerate 
unknown propagation of packets unless specific 
white-listing of message-types is included in the 
security definitions it adheres to.   
Figure 1 shows a grouping of twelve MANET 
nodes, all of which are members of the same 
network. All nodes have secure end-to-end 
connections with each other, forming a VPN. In a 
VPN, the links on the route to a destination are 
unimportant, security services are applied to the 
packet and the route is trusted to propagate it towards 
a destination. As a result, the trustworthiness and 
reliability of each node on a route are unimportant to 
the VPN. 
 
 
Figure 1. A full-mesh VPN of twelve nodes 
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MANET nodes must assume the role of router 
and end-point to maintain a viable network. As a 
result, the intermediate nodes in a route cannot be 
assumed to simply route messages between distant 
nodes; they have the capability to act on received 
data, storing it or relaying it to third parties. End-to-
end communication may be secure, but the 
incorporation of untrusted nodes into the routing 
process represents a significant security risk in the 
long term. It must be noted that unless a secure 
routing method is selected for the MANET, routing 
will be insecure; allowing any nodes with the 
appropriate suite of protocols to participate. For 
example, Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) [17] will allow any responding node also 
using AODV within the defined address space to 
participate in routing, allowing potential attackers to 
be incorporated into the network topology directly. 
This applies to any unsecured routing protocol.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. A full-mesh VCN of ten nodes with two non-member 
nodes in communication range 
 
Figure 2 shows an abstraction of a VCN. Ten 
nodes are in the VCN (blue nodes), while two (the 
grey nodes) are not. Being in a VCN means being 
recognised by the network as a legitimate member 
node. Appropriate confidentiality, integrity and 
authentication protocols must be applied across all 
node, both end-to-end and point-to-point for a 
MANET to be considered to be a closed-network.  
Member nodes may only communicate with each 
other securely; they will not trust grey nodes to 
propagate their traffic intentionally (though it may 
still be received). The rectangle boundary around the 
network represents the virtual element of the closure 
of the network. This is an abstraction of closure; the 
actual closure is performed on each node. Because of 
this, the heavy black lines between blue nodes 
represent that they must be neighbours to uphold the 
protocols keeping the network closed against outside 
intrusion.  
VCNs are not as far-reaching in scope as VPNs, 
due to this tightly-knit security approach. A VCN 
may use a VPN to communicate over unreliable 
infrastructure to reach another VCN, end-point or 
designated network of another type, as an extension 
of its communication. Alone, a VCN closes the 
target network against outside observation and 
interference at the node level. By ensuring all nodes 
adhere to the same security protocols, even the most 
distributed network may protect itself in a unified 
manner, mitigating the effects of an open 
communication medium by ensuring that observers 
may only obtain encrypted data, and are refused 
participation in the routing of such information.  
 
4. SUPERMAN: A Novel VCN  
 
Security Using Pre-Existing Routing for Mobile 
Ad hoc Networks (SUPERMAN), is a novel security 
framework that, at its core, represents a VCN 
approach to MANET security. The development of 
SUPERMAN was driven by the need for 
autonomous UAV networks; resource limited 
networks comprised of lightweight nodes. Such 
networks have specific communication requirements; 
they require frequent communication to self-organise 
and distribute tasks, they require security to ensure 
that mission-data and network-data are not obtained 
or modified by malicious parties, and they must do 
both as efficiently as possible, due to the limited 
bandwidth.  
To ensure that all of these needs are met, a VCN 
approach has been proposed. Key to this approach, is 
the ability to authenticate new nodes and ensure that 
the network may accept new members and deprecate 
nodes as the need arises. This need is driven by the 
application in question; for example, a surveying 
task using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with a 
mission duration longer than the UAV’s maximum 
flight time. This would require that nodes (the 
UAVs) to be replaced in the deployed network as 
they need to leave to recharge and are replaced by 
new nodes.  
 
4.1. Establishing Secure Networks 
 
SUPERMAN uses a certificate-based approach to 
authenticate new nodes and allow them to become 
members of the network if they have the appropriate 
credentials. Once authenticated with the network, a 
node will begin to form secure links, by associating 
itself with other member nodes on-demand. It is at 
this point that knowledge of the state of nodes on a 
route becomes important.  
Nodes may participate in routing once they have 
become members of the network, using network-
wide keys for broadcast communication. They must 
securely associate with each other to communicate in 
a unicast or multicast manner. A SUPERMAN node 
must exchange a key-share with other nodes and 
perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange to generate 
appropriate keys for end-to-end and point-to-point 
cryptographic functions.  
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SUPERMAN nodes will not propagate such 
information along routes with non-member nodes, 
and no intermediate node in the route will propagate 
the security data to a neighbouring node it isn’t 
securely associated with. If nodes are network 
members, and are securely associated with each 
neighbouring node, the propagation of security 
credentials between end-points can begin. Security 
associations are formed on demand, when a source 
node requires direct communication with another 
which it doesn’t yet have security associations with.  
Due to the potentially large number of nodes in a 
SUPERMAN network, and the large amount of 
security associations that must be formed during the 
course of a mission, measures have been taken to 
reduce the communications overhead associated with 
this phase of security set-up.  
 
4.2. Efficient Node Association 
 
In VPN systems like IPsec, VPLS and OpenVPN, 
nodes will associate over an undetermined number of 
nodes in a route. It does not matter if these nodes are 
members of the VPN or untrusted infrastructure, the 
exchange of credentials occurs over the full length of 
the route.  
SUPERMAN employs a delegated authentication 
method to reduce the effective length of routes in the 
VCN, if possible. On request of a destination nodes 
key-share, if the route between the two nodes 
includes one or more nodes that have previous 
associated with the destination of the security 
association request, the first along the route with the 
destinations key-share will reply to that request on 
behalf of the destination, instead of forwarding the 
request along the route. This has the effect of 
shortening the length of the route between source 
and destination nodes during security association. 
This is possible as each SUPERMAN node 
maintains a security table of key shares associated 
with each node it has previous associated with. As 
keys are unique to the link between two associated 
nodes, delegated authentication does not allow the 
delegate node to form a key on behalf of the 
associating pair, instead, it merely passes on the 
required key share to allow the end-points to 
generate the cryptographic keys required to secure 
their communication link. This method allows for the 
expedient, efficient sharing of security information in 
a safe, robust manner. By allowing nodes to 
exchange the credentials of nodes they have securely 
associated with, the cost associated with exchanging 
authentication information securely over the full 
length of the route as one must in a VPN is 
mitigated.  
 
 
 
4.3. Security Overhead 
 
In addition to establishing a secure network, a 
VCN must protect data communicated over it. As 
VCN protocols, such as SUPERMAN, are 
implemented at the network layer as an integral 
element of the network interface itself, the VCN 
security elements can be inserted prior to the 
addition of header data.  
This also means that SUPERMAN packets only 
require one IP header, instead of requiring that an 
existing IP packet is encapsulated within a VPN 
packet with an additional IP header. As a result, the 
packet size is reduced when compared with many 
VPN protocols.  
This feature of the VCN approach provides low 
cost security, and avoids data duplication. It does not 
reduce the protection provided to the data packet, 
confidentiality is guaranteed end-to-end and point-to-
point. In addition, authentication is assured at each 
hop and between destination and source.    
 
5. Methodology 
 
5.1. Hypothesis 
 
It is hypothesised that the SUPERMAN VCN 
approach to secure MANET communication will 
provide a more efficient (less costly per node) set-up 
than its VPN equivalents. VPLS should benefit from 
its multicast capabilities in the latter link-securing 
stage of the security set-up process, relative to IPsec 
and OpenVPN. However, SUPERMAN should 
outperform all three VPN approaches, by ensuring 
that all nodes in the network may be trusted, and 
using this knowledge to allow the use of delegated 
authentication to reduce the effective distance 
between non-neighbouring nodes that must form a 
secure end-to-end link between themselves.  
 
5.2. Simulation Parameters 
 
Simulation is undertaken using MATLAB. IPsec, 
OpenVPN, VPLS and SUPERMAN are simulated to 
allow comparison of their end-to-end authentication 
and key generation communication. The number of 
communication events (transmissions, assumed to be 
within MTU) and number of bytes transmitted are 
recorded, reported and analysed. Table 2 outlines the 
simulation parameters for the experiments. 
The simulated network is a MANET of 10-100 
nodes. The network is fully connected, with a hop 
count of 5 setting the maximum boundary for the 
length of routes between nodes. Where required by 
the selected VPN protocol, node ID 1 is selected as 
the server for VPN authentication protocols.  
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Table 2. MATLAB simulation parameters 
 
Number of Nodes: 10 - 100 
Routing Algorithm: Dijkstrka [18]  
(shortest path) 
Number of Iterations: 50 
Simulation Area: 100m x 100m 
Communication Range: 50m 
Max Hop Count: 5 
Random Seed: 11 
Key Share Size: 128 bytes 
Certificate Size: 1013 bytes 
 
Due to the differing capabilities of the three VPN 
approaches selected for this comparison, two 
experiments have been devised, both adhering to the 
settings outlined in Table 2. It is assumed that the 
network suffers no loss or packet corruption. 
 
5.2.1 Network authentication. This experiment 
involves the authentication of nodes with the 
network itself. IPsec and OpenVPN do not extend 
network authentication functionality, being focused 
on client-server and client-client pairings for secure 
tunnel formation.  
SUPERMAN and VPLS, set up a network within 
a network, instead of just forming peer-to-peer links 
over an untrusted medium (the internet in the case of 
most VPN). This has the added benefit of allowing 
multipoint connectivity. As a result, both approaches 
require that nodes authenticate with the network.  
SUPERMAN nodes must authenticate with each 
other using certificates issued by a trusted authority. 
This trusted authority is only required during 
initialisation, and when certificates need to be 
updated. 
VPLS designates a central server that 
authenticates nodes and equips them with 
unidirectional (initiator and responder) keys common 
to the broadcast virtual Ethernet mesh used for VPN 
communication. VPLS does not extend services to 
routing, it is assumed that routing will take place 
without VPLS securing those routes. All routes are 
pre-generated for VPLS, whereas SUPERMAN will 
only begin routing once nodes have authenticated 
with the network (receiving broadcast keys in the 
process).  
This experiment involves the comparison of 
VPLS and SUPERMAN network authentication 
communication, analysing the number of 
communication events and bytes transmitted to 
achieve full network authentication.  
 
5.2.2 Key negotiation (end-to-end). SUPERMAN, 
OpenVPN, IPsec and VPLS all secure tunnels 
between nodes. This is the primary function of all 
four approaches, though SUPERMAN and VPLS 
extend further network authentication procedures to 
facilitate more complex use of network topology 
during communication over secure tunnels.  
All four approaches are simulated forming secure 
tunnels between all nodes in the target network. This 
is assumed to be performed in an isolated 
environment with nodes only communicating 
security information during this process; no ancillary 
communication can occur until the process is 
complete. The number of communication events and 
amount of data (in bytes) required by this process is 
compared to highlight the differences between the 
VPN protocols selected and the SUPERMAN VCN 
framework. 
 
5.2.3 Secure task allocation. Task allocation is an 
example of a highly distributed, autonomous 
application used by mobile nodes. Consensus Based 
Bundle Algorithm (CBBA) and Cluster Form CBBA 
(CF-CBBA) are examples of task allocation 
algorithms [2]. They provide a means by which 
groups of nodes can collaborate autonomously, 
performing complex tasks as a team. As a result, they 
have been chosen as the representation of an 
ongoing, vital application. 
Such applications require security to ensure that 
they reach a solution that is agreed upon by all 
participating nodes. They also require protection 
against modification of data, to ensure that no 
malicious factors are allowed to affect the outcomes 
of the task allocation process. VPN and VCN 
services can provide that protection.  
Table 3 defines the simulation parameters for this 
experiment.  
 
Table 3. MATLAB simulation parameters 
 
Number of Nodes: 18 
Cluster 
Configurations: 
CBBA:  
18 nodes (no clusters) 
CF-CBBA 1:  
3 clusters of 6 nodes 
CF-CBBA 2:  
6 clusters of 3 nodes 
Number of Iterations: 50 
Simulation Area: 100m x 100m 
Communication Range: 50m 
Max Hop Count: 5 
Random Seed: 11 
Number of Tasks 1-50 
 
Eighteen nodes are tasked with a simple mapping 
problem. They must travel to randomly generated 
waypoints, represented by tasks. Nodes must 
complete task as efficiently as possible delegating to 
nodes that are better suited for travel to a given 
waypoint then others. This is handled by the task 
allocation algorithm.  
Two algorithms, sharing a common root 
algorithm, are used. CBBA [10] does not support 
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clustered networks, and is used for the simulations in 
which nodes act as one large network. CF-CBBA [2] 
is used to demonstrate the benefits of clustering 
when considering network resource consumption.  
Both algorithms have their communication 
protected by IPsec, VPLS, OpenVPN and 
SUPERMAN. The comparison of these protocols is 
intended to allow the analysis of the security service 
provision of each protocol, compared with their 
respective security overheads (the number of bytes 
transmitted during task allocation, including 
security). 
Analysis of the network resource requirements of 
secure task allocation will allow an evaluation of the 
suitability of VPN and VCN approaches. This 
evaluation will specifically address suitability of 
either approach in the context of autonomous mobile 
ad hoc networks.  
 
6. Results 
 
Results are broken down into three types; network 
authentication, secure tunnelling and secure task 
allocation. These are further broken down into the 
number of communication events and the number of 
bytes transmitted. A sub-section analysing and 
discussing the security dimensions addressed by the 
VPN and VCN approaches that have been simulated, 
provides routing and security service analysis. This 
comparison is intended to identify the desirable 
features possessed by the VPN and VCN approaches 
to MANET security. 
 
6.1. Network Authentication 
 
Figure 3 shows the number of communication 
events required by SUPERMAN and VPLS during 
authentication with the network.  
 
Figure 3. Graph showing the number of communication events 
required to authenticate all nodes with the network 
 
VPLS is shown to consistently require more 
communication events to achieve network 
authentication than SUPERMAN. VPLS requires a 
central server for authentication with the mesh-like 
VLAN environment it creates for all member nodes, 
creating a central point of failure for the 
authentication of new nodes. This can also result in 
long routes between nodes and the central server 
node, unless the MANET maintains a dense 
topology.  
SUPERMAN, only requiring that the 
neighbouring node (any node in range) is an 
authentic SUPERMAN node, with the appropriate 
certificate and protocol suite to facilitate network 
authentication, is more efficient in terms of 
communication events. In networks of 100 nodes, 
SUPERMAN requires 38% less communication 
events than VPLS.  
Figure 4, however, demonstrates that the 
SUPERMAN requirement that certificates are 
exchanged bi-directionally and that neighbouring 
nodes perform security association alongside 
network authentication leads to much higher data 
requirements, despite fewer transmissions.  
VPLS requires that the central authentication 
server provides a certificate to nodes able to 
authenticate with it via a puzzle-solution exchange 
mechanism. Successful authentication results in a 
certificate being exchanged with the petitioning node 
by the authentication server. Once authenticated, the 
node becomes a member of the VPLS mesh-Ethernet 
broadcast domain governed by the server.  
 
 
Figure 4. Graph showing the number of bytes transmitted when 
authenticating all nodes with the network 
 
The completion of the authentication process 
results in the petitioning node possessing a Diffie-
Hellman derived key for the VPLS domain to which 
it has subscribed, and a certificate as proof of its 
validity (provided by the authentication server).  
SUPERMAN is shown to initially require less 
data than VPLS to authenticate with the network, but 
rapidly grows in cost as the network increases in 
size. This is due to the incorporation of identifying 
information and a key share in discovery packets, 
driving up the cost of probing for potential 
authenticator nodes.  
VPLS requires 15.8% of the data needed by 
SUPERMAN, as connections with the central 
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authenticator node are established using a 
lightweight exchange of puzzle and solution data, the 
exchange of which is initiated by simple HELLO 
messages and terminated by a signed 
acknowledgement. The initialisation and termination 
messages are substantially smaller than those used by 
SUPERMAN, as point-to-point security is not 
applied. Diffie-Hellman key data is only exchanged 
once a connection has been established with the 
authentication server, reducing the size of HELLO 
packets considerable, when compared to 
SUPERMAN equivalents.  
However, this process is entirely dependent on the 
central node being reachable. VPLS does not 
participate in, or secure, routing. As a result, the 
intermediate nodes involved in the communication of 
credentials between the authentication server and 
petitioning nodes cannot be considered as 
trustworthy. Any loss of contact or destruction of the 
central node will result in the authentication process 
failing and the node being unable to join the 
network.  
SUPERMAN is resilient against such disruption, 
as it only requires that two nodes sharing a common-
trusted-source (the certificate issuer or a higher 
authority shared by their issuers) to communicate 
and form a new SUPERMAN network. The 
additional cost is high, but required in networks with 
unpredictable topology and communication medium, 
such as MANETs.  
VPLS will establish a VPN at a low initial cost, 
but only assuming that loss rates are low and that the 
central node remains reachable at all times. 
SUPERMAN, operating in a pre-route MANET (in 
which no routes have been formed), will incur a 
higher cost due to the larger packets and one-hop 
topology of the network during the authentication 
process leading to a more communication-intensive 
authentication process. SUPERMAN will, however, 
provide security to routing among nodes that have 
authenticated with the network and point-to-point 
security, whereas VPLS will not provide any security 
to routing among networked nodes and does not 
secure packets point-to-point.   
 
6.2. Secure Tunneling 
 
Figure 5 shows that SUPERMAN requires the 
least communication events to have all nodes form 
security associations (secure tunnels) between all 
other network members. IPsec requires the most by a 
considerable margin, while VPLS and OpenVPN, 
sharing a tunnel forwarding mechanism, have 
consistently similar communication event counts.  
 
Figure 5. Graph showing the number of communication events 
that occur during the formation of secure tunnels between all 
nodes 
 
SUPERMAN makes significant gains when 
forming secure tunnels between nodes. A delegated 
authentication mechanism allows SUPERMAN 
nodes to vouch for nodes that they know to be 
legitimate if they are on the route between source 
and destination when a source node attempts to form 
a secure tunnel with the destination node. This is 
possible due to the topology-aware characteristics of 
VCNs. When a MANET of 100 nodes is attempting 
to form secure tunnels between all member nodes, 
delegated authentication results in SUPERMAN 
requiring 19.5% less communication than VPLS and 
OpenVPN, and 46.3% less than IPsec.  
Figure 6 shows that SUPERMAN, in networks of 
up to 47 nodes, requires the least data transmission to 
form secure tunnels. In larger networks, VPLS shows 
considerable scalability. IPsec is demonstrably the 
most expensive approach in terms of data utilisation 
for large networks, though in smaller network (60 
nodes or fewer) OpenVPN is costlier in terms of 
data.  
 
Figure 6. Graph showing the number of bytes transmitted when 
establishing secure tunnels between nodes 
 
VPLS requires 45% less data to be transmitted to 
secure all nodes in the network, when compared with 
SUPERMAN in 100 node MANETs. This is due to 
the broadcast mesh-Ethernet approach taken by 
VPLS. Nodes do not require complicated key 
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exchanges, the central server determines send and 
receive keys ahead of tunnel formation, requiring 
that nodes only have to exchange identifying 
information and a puzzle variable to associate with 
each other. SUPERMAN requires the change of key 
shares to allow Diffie-Hellman key generation to 
occur and provide a unique key associated with the 
end-to-end and point-to-point links between source 
and destination.  
SUPERMAN does benefit from the delegate 
authentication mechanism, which reduces the 
effective length of routes by allowing intermediate 
nodes already associated with the destination of a 
request for secure association to intervene and 
prevent further propagation of the request as it 
services the source-request for destination-
credentials. As a result, SUPERMAN requires 9.2% 
less data than OpenVPN, and 41% less data than 
IPsec in a 100 node network. 
Compared with VPLS, SUPERMAN offers point-
to-point authentication and secure routing. VPLS 
offers neither of these services. As a result, 
SUPERMAN requires larger packets, but this 
provides extended and vital security services to the 
network.  
  
6.3. Secure Task Allocation 
 
Establishing a secure network is only one part of 
the VPN and VCN function. Providing secure 
communication to applications that require it is an 
ongoing service and can be considered the most 
important measure. As the comparison has been 
performed on the same allocation process in each 
iteration, the data is uniform aside from the addition 
of security overhead. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the cost of performing 
CBBA task allocation, but it is important to note that 
the spikes and troughs in the data are driven by the 
underlying behaviour of the task allocation protocol. 
CBBA, more so than CF-CBBA, varies in the 
amount of allocation rounds required before reaching 
convergence. This number is affected by the number 
of nodes, their position respective to the task 
distribution in the simulation space and number of 
tasks. This occurs in such a way that it may be less 
computationally intensive to compute 45 tasks than it 
is to compute 40.  
Figure 7 provides the results of CBBA simulation, 
using IPsec, VPLS, OpenVPN (OVPN) and 
SUPERMAN to secure the task allocation process.  
IPsec is the most expensive of the four protocols, 
requiring 32% more bytes than SUPERMAN to 
provide security to a 50 task CBBA process. VPLS is 
second most expensive, by a thin margin, requiring 
30% more network resources than SUPERMAN.  
OpenVPN is a significant improvement over 
IPsec and VPLS in terms of security overhead. It 
requires 19.6% more data than SUPERMAN.  
 
Figure 7. Graph showing the number of bytes transmitted when 
performing CBBA on 18 nodes 
 
The primary contributing factor to SUPERMAN’s 
apparent efficiency is the avoidance of data 
duplication, SUPERMAN does not require the 
encapsulation of whole data packets. It appends 
SUPERMAN security data to the data itself, before 
adding the IP header. This avoids duplication of the 
IP header.    
Figure 8 shows the results of a CF-CBBA 
simulation using 3 clusters of 6 nodes. The data 
overhead of task allocation is significantly lower 
than that of CBBA, due to the partitioning of the 
number of tasks and processing between multiple 
clusters. This effectively allows the problem to be 
processed in parallel, reducing the amount of 
communication required.  
 
Figure 8. Graph showing the number of bytes transmitted when 
performing CF-CBBA in 3 clusters of 6 nodes 
 
The trend observed in Figure 8 persists in Figure 
9. For 50 task problems, IPsec requires 30.6% more 
data than SUPERMAN. VPLS requires 28.5% more 
data, and OpenVPN needs an additional 18.8% of 
data when compared against SUPERMAN in 50 task 
problems.  
Figure 9 presents the results of simulation for a 
CF-CBBA process involving 3 clusters of 6 nodes. 
This is presented in addition to the results shown in 
Figure 9 as the organisation of nodes into clusters 
has an effect on the communication requirements of 
the task allocation process. This configuration is 
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costlier than the 3 cluster scenario used in Figure 9, 
but provides results with higher optimality when 
considering how nodes will execute allocated tasks 
[2].  
 
Figure 9. Graph showing the number of bytes transmitted when 
performing CF-CBBA in 6 clusters of 3 nodes 
 
The results observed here have much in common 
with Figures 7 and 8. IPsec requires 32.3% more data 
than SUPERMAN for 50 task problems. VPLS 
requires 30.2% more data. Compared with 
SUPERMAN, OpenVPN requires 20.7% more data.  
These results show that the security overhead of 
SUPERMAN is consistently lower than that of IPsec, 
VPLS and OpenVPN. Furthermore, it is shown that 
the configuration of nodes within the network, and 
the choice of task allocation protocol has no effect on 
the security overhead of VPN and VCN protocols, as 
evidenced by the similarity of security overhead 
comparisons in all three experiments.  
In each experiment, IPsec is shown to have the 
highest cost, in terms of additional bytes required to 
secure communication. This is unsurprising, 
considering its focus on infrastructural, wireline 
networks that can rely on a robust and reliable 
communication medium.  
VPLS is the second costliest, in each case. Like 
IPsec, it must encapsulate the data packet in a 
security packet, leading to address duplication. 
Unlike IPsec, VPLS does not require exhaustive 
configuration data in its header, instead requiring 
only the addition of MPLS data if operating in a 
MANET or telecommunications network 
configuration, and a 4 byte VPLS network identifier.  
OpenVPN reduces overhead further, by avoiding 
the use of configuration data entirely. OpenVPN 
assumes that any member node will be 
knowledgeable about the configuration of the target 
VPN after it has joined.  
It is the role of the VPN server to update any 
configuration data required by member nodes. 
Although this limits the flexibility and dynamism of 
OpenVPN, especially in a MANET scenario, it does 
result in a relatively small header for a VPN service.  
As the VCN approach does not require 
duplication of data in the header, all SUPERMAN 
packets have comparatively low security overheads.  
 
6.4. Provision of Security Services 
 
ITU-T Rec X.805, as previously discussed, 
outlines eight security dimensions. These must be 
addressed at least in part to provide a secure 
environment for communication over any network.  
Table 4 outlines the security dimensions provided 
by SUPERMAN, VPLS, OpenVPN and IPsec. 
SUPERMAN extends all eight security dimensions, 
providing access control by closing the network 
against any outside use or interference. Only nodes 
authenticated with the network may use network 
resources. Furthermore, adherence to the VCNs 
security protocols provides non-repudiation and 
communication security, which VPN approaches 
cannot guarantee.  
The three VPN approaches do not provide access 
control, non-repudiation or communication security. 
None of the three analysed frameworks provide 
access control. VPLS controls access to the mesh-
Ethernet domain it establishes, but nodes may still be 
routed over, unless segregated from the untrusted 
infrastructure over-which it may be communicating.  
The VPNs analysed do not provide non-
repudiation, as connections are usually end-to-end. 
Higher-authorities are involved in the authentication 
of nodes and provision of credentials to secure 
tunnels. This means that once a node has been given 
appropriate credentials, it is possible for that node to 
deny malicious action, unless trust-based systems are 
put in place to augment the baseline security 
provided by the VPN. Some implementations of 
IPsec and VPLS allow for unique timestamping to 
add an additional layer of identification to packets, 
providing a measure of non-repudiation by tying 
specific packets to identities in an irrefutable 
manner.  
 
Table 4. The ITU-T Rec X.805 Security Dimension coverage of 
SUPERMAN (SMAN), VPLS, OpenVPN and IPsec 
 
Security 
Dimension 
SMAN VPLS OpenVPN IPsec 
Access 
Control 
X    
Auth. X X X X 
Non-
repudiation 
X    
Data 
Confidence 
X X X X 
Comm. 
Security 
X    
Data 
Integrity 
X X X X 
Availability X X X X 
Privacy X X X X 
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Communication security requires that information 
flows only between authorised end-points. Due to the 
tolerance of untrusted infrastructure by VPN 
approaches this cannot be guaranteed. Though it may 
be argued that the open-medium problem of wireless 
communication would compromise SUPERMAN’s 
provision of such services, SUPERMAN does not 
allow routing over untrusted nodes. It therefore does 
not compromise communication security as a 
function of the framework itself, though it cannot 
entirely mitigate the open-medium problem.  
By closing the network, using a VCN philosophy 
to prevent the use of untrusted routes, one can 
protect a MANET against trivial insertion of hostile 
nodes, identity theft and the destruction or 
dissemination of data by intermediate untrusted 
nodes on routes between end-points. SUPERMAN’s 
additional cost is reflective of greater security service 
provision, and a more granular approach to network 
security in highly mobile, dynamic MANETs.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
When comparing VPN and VCN approaches, it is 
important to bear in mind the target network. VPNs 
typically provide end-to-end security over untrusted 
infrastructure (with no security guarantees regarding 
the route taken between end-points), while VCNs 
secure a specific network by locking it down 
completely and not allowing propagation of data 
over untrusted parties to form a part of operational 
principle.  
SUPERMAN, the VCN approach used as an 
example in this paper, also protects routing, and 
forms a secure network environment prior to routing 
operations. VPN approaches require that 
infrastructure is pre-existing, and that infrastructure 
may not be trustworthy.  
Indeed, VPNs are intended to function over 
untrusted infrastructure, but for distributed MANETs 
of many nodes, this may not be feasible due to the 
relative intelligence of MANET nodes over static 
infrastructure. Untrusted nodes in a MANET 
scenario have far greater power to destroy or reroute 
data than mono-task switches and routers in 
conventional infrastructural networks, making them 
a significant threat to quality of service and network 
resources.  
VPN approaches to secure MANETs have been 
recorded in a considerable body of scientific 
literature, including attempts to use IPsec, OpenVPN 
and VPLS to allow secure communication between 
MANET nodes in wireless sensor, micro-UAV and 
UAV swarm scenarios. Each approach tends to treat 
other MANET nodes as untrusted, ignoring the 
potential offered by the topology-awareness and 
control of MANET nodes. VPN approaches fail to 
account for a variety of attacks that MANETs are 
extremely vulnerable to, for example, man-in-the-
middle, impersonation and Sybil attacks. They are 
also vulnerable to attacks that abuse route-agnostic 
systems, such as black hole and wormhole attacks. 
A VCN ensures that only authenticated members 
of the network are included on secure 
communication routes, mitigating the issues caused 
by route-agnostic communication being abused by 
malicious undetected intermediate nodes. The 
proposed framework extends cost-saving measures, 
as MANETs have a potentially unreliable 
communication medium, resource-constrained 
network hardware, in many cases.  
Simulation of SUPERMAN and three VPN 
approaches has shown that SUPERMAN performs 
favourably when considering the number of 
transmissions required to authenticate all nodes with 
the network and form secure tunnels between all 
nodes. However, VPLS has been shown, in 100% 
reliable communication conditions, to require less 
data due to its lightweight, low-complexity approach 
to constructing a virtual mesh-Ethernet domain for 
its member nodes. As discussed in sub-section 6.3, 
the inclusion of untrusted nodes in the routing 
process, and the lack of route-security under VPLS, 
compromises any expectations of 100% delivery 
rates. VPLS does not address the core issues of 
route-agnosticism leading to an inability to diagnose 
and cope with rerouting, destruction and 
manipulation of data between nodes. It also is not 
designed with unreliable transport as a consideration, 
requiring a reliable (if untrusted) infrastructure to 
facilitate communication between nodes.  
Simulation of SUPERMAN, IPsec, VPLS and 
OpenVPN in the context of providing security for 
application communication, showed that 
SUPERMAN is more efficient than its VPN peers. 
This is due to the integration of SUPERMAN into 
the network stack itself, it operates as an integral part 
of the flow of data from the application layer through 
the network layer. As a result, it does not need to 
encapsulate data packets, and avoids the additional 
cost of IP and TCP/UDP data duplication. This 
makes it a suitable candidate for security in resource 
constrained networks that afford nodes a high level 
of individual control over the network. MANETs, 
especially autonomous ones, are a good example of 
such a network.  
In highly mobile MANETs with potentially 
unreliable wireless communication, packet loss may 
be considerable. This would have a highly adverse 
effect on VPLS, as it requires periodic 
communication with a central node on the part of all 
member nodes to ensure all keys are up to date for 
secure communication. As a result, it may be 
concluded that expecting 100% delivery rates in a 
MANET is ill-advised, even before considering the 
inherent unreliability of wireless communication. It 
is trivial for malicious nodes to place themselves on 
a route, and sink or disseminate data, as VPLS does 
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not provide any protection other than integrity and 
confidentiality to data in transit, and is unaware of 
the route taken.  
Future work will focus on mobile nodes with 
variable reliability to further analyse the 
effectiveness and efficiency of VPN and VCN 
approaches to secure MANET communication. Of 
particular interest is the effect that increasing loss 
rates will have on VPLS, as it has performed very 
well in terms of efficient communication for 
scenarios assuming perfect communication 
characteristics. Side-by-side comparison of 
SUPERMAN and VPLS will be a focal point in the 
research undertaken to analyse the effect of mobility 
and unreliable communication on secure MANET 
formation; and how such negative impacts on 
performance can be reduced.  
In addition, an implementation of SUPERMAN as 
a Linux kernel module and daemon is under 
development and a real-world comparison of 
SUPERMAN and VPLS will be considered as well 
as the release of SUPERMAN under an open source 
software licence. 
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